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The major theme which dominates the author's analysis is the national security dilemma: how does a nation balance the need to protect legitimate national secrets with the need for openness in a democratic society? Professor Guillemin rightly points out that the BW programs of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations were developed in secret. Secrecy insured that BW policy, unlike the nuclear and chemical weapons programs, was never publicly debated. Moreover, in the current political atmosphere, dominated by fears of bioterrorism, the imperatives demanded by secrecy have assumed obsessive dominance. The dangers of such a continued course of action are evident. Too much secrecy can hamper defensive planning, coordination, and response in case of a BW attack. The first responders may be hindered during and after a terrorist attack by being denied the intelligence and information necessary for their rescue and recovery operations. Professor Guillemin, a firm believer in internationalist rather than unilateral solutions to the challenge posed by the BW threat, eloquently argues for the cause of greater openness in national security policy.

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The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War. By Andrew J. Bacevich. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-19-517338-5. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xii, 270. $28.00.

In the early 1990s Edward Luttwak, Russell F. Weigley, and Richard Kohn published essays in which they argued that there was a crisis in civil-military relations in the United States. More recently books by Kohn and Peter Feaver, Andrew Bacevich, and Eliot Cohen have expanded on this theme. All, to one degree or another, concern themselves with the politicization of the late twentieth-century American military. Bacevich's most recent work, *The New American Militarism,* however, turns the argument on its head: rather than focusing on the politicization of the military, Bacevich outlines the militarization of American politics and culture.

Alfred Vagts posited that "An army that is so built that it serves military men, not war, is militaristic; so is everything in an army which is not preparation for fighting, but merely exists for diversion or to satisfy peacetime whims." Bacevich depicts a post-Vietnam military whose actions fit Vagts's definition: hamstringing civil authority by structuring the military so that the nation could not go to war without the Reserves and National Guard; the military leadership's role in developing the Weinberger Doctrine; the Weinberger Doctrine's subsequent manifestation, the Powell Doctrine; and the military's insistence on preparing for two "Major Regional Contingencies" at a time when one MRC seemed increasingly unlikely; all appear to match Vagts's criteria. More importantly, the military, according to Bacevich, ignored the lessons of Vietnam, preferring to focus on the defense of Central

Europe, a mission that it likely would never carry out, but one that would help resurrect an army that had been morally destroyed in Southeast Asia. This emphasis on Europe suggests a military concerned with serving its own narrow interests.

But Bacevich quickly shifts gears to concentrate on the role people and institutions outside the military played in the growth of American militarism. After Vietnam, neoconservative writers such as Norman Podhoretz provided the intellectual basis for a larger military as well as for the use of force in circumstances that were not purely defensive. "As always," Bacevich writes, "crisis loomed. As always, Americans faced a choice that was as stark as it was clear-cut. As always, neoconservatives saw the way out: through war, the United States might save the world" (p. 96). President Jimmy Carter's response to the Iranian Hostage Crisis and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan added substance to the neocon position and provided fodder for candidate Ronald Reagan. President Reagan subsequently immersed his administration in military imagery as no president had ever done and, according to Bacevich, sold the United States a romantic view of the military and of war. This, he concludes, "played well in Peoria" (p. 111).

As did military themes in popular culture. *Top Gun, Rambo,* and *An Officer and a Gentleman,* Bacevich contends, helped change Americans' perceptions of the post-Vietnam military, but none appear as important in this regard as the works of Tom Clancy. Clancy's books and films, according to Bacevich, have a standard plot line: "[T]he international order is a dangerous and threatening place. . . . That Americans have managed to avoid Armageddon is attributable to a single fact: the men and women of the American uniformed military and of its intelligence services have managed to avert those threats" (p. 117). Clancy's popularity speaks volumes regarding his influence.

Perhaps Bacevich's most surprising assertion is that modern American Christianity contributed significantly toward the rise of American militarism. During the Vietnam War, Christian conservatives, according to Bacevich, "saw the rise of antiwar sentiment, popular disparagement of the armed services, and the wasting away of American military strength . . . as indicators of the path down which the United States was headed," a view which melded easily with Christians' critique of American society (p. 127). "Many evangelicals," Bacevich continues, came to "view the requirements of U.S. national security in the here-and-now and the final accomplishment of Christ's saving mission at the end of time as closely related if not indistinguishable" (p. 132). By the early 1990s, he contends, Christian support for military exploits was "knee-jerk bellicosity" (p. 143), and 9/11 simply reinforced their willingness to practice war. Bacevich concludes that "Conservative Christians. . . . have fostered among the legions of believing Americans a predisposition to see U.S. military power as inherently good. . . . In doing so, they have nurtured the preconditions that have enabled the American infatuation with military power to flourish" (p. 146).

Other chapters outline the role played by what Bacevich calls the "War Club" (Albert Wohlstetter and Andrew Marshall, among others), and by the growing American involvement in the Middle East (what he calls "World War Four") in the growth of American militarism. Bacevich concludes by offering ten "fundamental principles" upon which future United States military policy should rely in an effort to reverse the nation's slide toward militarism. All are valuable suggestions and should be the subject of reasoned debate but, given the degree to which things military are no longer open to discussion, they seem likely to be ignored.

The book's one shortcoming is that it draws its historical net much too narrowly. The trauma of Pearl Harbor, the advent of nuclear weapons carried by ICBMs, and the fear engendered by a forty-five-year Cold War appear to have been key elements in the public's willingness to tolerate an incredibly bloated military establishment. Too, Joe McCarthy's charges in the 1950s that "Democrats are soft on Communism," very easily became the Republican Party's battle cry in the 1970s that "Democrats are soft on defense," thus making it impossible for any serious Democratic presidential candidate to recommend military reductions.

This is a provocative book. It will anger many who read it and, in this bitterly partisan era, its author will be condemned unfairly as being partisan. Anyone with an interest in U.S. military, diplomatic, or political history, or in civil-military relations, or in current military policy should seriously consider Bacevich's argument and proposals, and the book should be required reading for all students at the nation's staff and war colleges. If those institutions simply dismiss this book, Kohn's, Weigley's, Cohen's, and Bacevich's concerns will be validated.

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Soldier Dead: How We Recover, Bury, and Honor Our Military Fallen. By Michael Sledge. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-231-13514-9. Photographs. Notes. Index. Pp. x, 357. $29.95.

Michael Sledge, a journalist with a background in sociology, psychology, and the behavior of military personnel, has written an engaging but sobering account of how the United States deals with dead military personnel. As an embedded journalist with the Army's 54th Mortuary Affairs Company during the 2003 Iraq War, he also brings first-hand knowledge of the process. Sledge concentrates on policies, procedures, and practice during World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, with additional evidence presented from the Civil War through the invasion of Iraq. The book explores in considerable and enlightening detail the question: "What happens to members of the United States Armed Forces after they die [explicitly die in combat]"?